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The JOBS Act: Unintended Consequences of 
the “Facebook Bill” 
Tyler Adam*
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), in part, amended § 12(g) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Originally enacted to impose mandatory 
disclosure requirements on non-reporting companies with a significant volume 
of trading, § 12(g) became dysfunctional due to changes in the market 
landscape.  The JOBS Act amended § 12(g), first, by raising the shareholders of 
record threshold, and second, by excluding from the threshold number persons 
who received securities pursuant to certain employee compensation plans.  This 
note argues that the JOBS Act’s retooling of § 12(g) fails to adequately resolve 
fundamental problems with the rule.  Specifically, the amendments will promote 
a dysfunctional standard for the mandatory disclosure triggering requirements, 
which will enable public companies to manipulate the rule.  Additionally, it will 
reduce the number of IPOs, which is not the best policy for spurring job growth 
and economic growth.  These unintended consequences can be avoided by 
changing the § 12(g) triggering requirements to a two-tiered approach that 
regulates the private and public spheres using different metrics.  These metrics 
should reflect trading volumes and beneficial ownership of public and private 
companies, respectively.  
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  I would like to 
thank Professor Abraham J.B. Cable for his insight and contributions, without which this note 
would not have been possible.  Additionally, I am grateful to my family for their unending 
support. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”).  The JOBS Act is intended to 
stimulate job creation and economic growth by improving the ability of 
emerging growth companies to gain access to the public capital 
markets.1  In part, the JOBS Act amended § 12(g) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 19342
Prior to the JOBS Act, § 12(g) required any securities issuer with 
total assets exceeding $10 million
 (“1934 Act”). 
3 and a class of nonexempted 
securities held of record by five hundred or more to file a registration 
statement with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”).4  
Although § 12(g) does not require companies to list shares on the 
public markets, once a company is required to register with the SEC, it 
may be induced to go public to benefit from being able to raise capital 
on the public markets.5  Therefore, the rule effectively forces 
companies meeting its requirement to initiate an initial public offering 
(“IPO”).6
The JOBS Act amended § 12(g), first, by raising the shareholders 
of record threshold from 500 to either 2,000 persons, or 500 persons 
who are not accredited investors (the “Threshold Provision”).
 
7  Second, 
the Act further expanded the § 12(g) mandatory registration threshold 
by excluding persons who received securities pursuant to employee 
compensation plans in transactions exempted from the registration 
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”).8  The 
Threshold Provision of the JOBS Act has been referred to as the 
“Facebook Bill”9
 
 1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). 
 because leading up to its initial registration with the 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Relief from Reporting by Small Insurers, Exchange Act Release No. 37157 (May 8, 
1996). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (West 2011). 
 5. Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook May Be Forced to Go Public Amid Market Gloom, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/facebook-may-be-
forced-to-go-public-amid-market-gloom/. 
 6. See id. 
 7. H.R. 3606, § 501. 
 8. Id.  The Threshold Provision incorporates the basic premises of two bills that were 
moving through the Houses, which, similarly, sought to increase the minimum record shareholder 
threshold requirement (S. 1824, 112 Cong. and H.R. 2167, 112th Cong.).  Although H.R. 3606 is the 
session law at issue in this note, fundamentally, each of these bills sought to increase the 
registration threshold.  Therefore this note cites to legislative history of each of them. 
 9. Garett Sloane, Facebook Bill Gets A Boost, N.Y. POST (Dec. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/facebook_bill_gets_boost_aVqLy3FrOzDMdy3Ryc5v8
K. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on February 1, 2012,10 
the 500-shareholder rule was cited as a reason Facebook would be 
forced to register with the SEC.11
Creating legislation that makes capital formation easier has been 
one of President Obama’s key objectives.
 
12  Upon signing the JOBS Act, 
Obama articulated that the bill will make it easier for companies to go 
public, which is an “important step towards expanding and hiring more 
workers.”13  Proponents of increasing the § 12(g) mandatory 
registration threshold argued that it was outdated and unnecessarily 
impeded capital formation for startup companies.14  Their hope is that 
the changes to § 12(g) will alleviate challenges to capital formation and 
spur job growth.15
In recent years, companies have faced a difficult financing 
landscape.  To begin, startup companies have limited financing 
options: they can raise capital through borrowing or equity financing.
 
16  
In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, borrowing has become 
difficult because banks have tightened their lending standards.17  As a 
result, equity financing is increasingly essential for startups to gain 
capital.18  One form of equity financing is conducting an IPO.  
Companies typically enter the public markets in order to gain access to 
capital necessary to hire employees and expand business operations.19  
An IPO represents a significant step in a young company’s growth 
cycle.20  However, the equity financing process in the public markets 
has become more burdensome in recent years due to increased 
regulations.21  As a result, the number of IPOs has decreased.22
A report published in August 2011 indicated that since 1991, the 
 
 
 10. Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012). 
 11. See Dan Primack, Killing The 500-Shareholder Rule, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/08/ending-the-500-shareholder-rule. 
 12. State of the Union 2012: Obama Speech Transcript, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2012), available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/state-of-the-union-2012-obama-speech-excerpts/ 
2012/01/24/gIQA9D3QOQstory4.html. 
 13. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill 
Signing (Apr. 5, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-
video/video/ 2012/04/05/president-obama-signs-jobs-act#transcript). 
 14. H.R. REP. NO. 112-327, at 2 (2011), 2011 WL 6184472. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB 
MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 1 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/ 
smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf. 
 20. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 9. 
 21. See Id.  “Unfortunately, a series of rules, regulation and other compliance issues aimed at 
large-cap, already-public companies has increased the time and costs required for emerging 
companies to take [the critical first step of doing an IPO].” 
 22. Id. at 1. 
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number of emerging growth companies conducting IPOs declined 
dramatically relative to historic levels.23  From 1991 to 2002, IPOs 
averaged 530 per year.24  In contrast, there were only 38 IPOs in 2008 
and 61 in 2009.25  Furthermore, between 1995 and 2010, the number 
of public companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges fell from 8,000 
to 5,000, while the number of listings on non-U.S. exchanges increased 
from 23,000 to 40,000.26  This trend has been referred to as “The Great 
Depression in Listings.”27
Reinvigorating the IPO market is vital to rejuvenating the job 
market because when companies raise money in the public markets 
they gain the resources necessary to expand and grow their employee 
base.  A study of 136 IPOs of venture-backed companies from 1970 to 
2009 found that, on average, 92 percent of job growth occurred post-
IPO.
 
28  The data represents the increase in the number of employees 
stated in public filings at the time of IPO and in the latest year 
available.29  Given the correlation between job creation and IPOs, it 
follows that the recent downturn in IPOs has had a staggering impact 
on the U.S. job market.  By one estimate, the decrease in companies 
entering the public markets cost America as many as 22 million jobs 
from 1997 through 2008.30
Despite the fact that IPOs are ultimately beneficial in creating job 
growth and maintaining robust public markets, for a company, going 
public is a significant undertaking.  The vast majority of small closely 
held companies avoid going public because: (1) remaining private is 
cheaper; (2) private companies are easier to operate; and (3) 





 23. TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 1.   
  First, remaining private is cheaper because private 
companies avoid the costs of periodically reporting to regulatory 
 24. David Weild & David Kim, Market Structure is Causing the IPO Crisis – and More, in GRANT 
THORNTON: CAPITAL MARKET SERIES 3 (2010), http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20 
companies%20and%20capital%20markets/Files/IPO%20crisis%20-
%20June%202010%20%20FINAL. pdf [hereinafter Weild & Kim, Market Structure]. 
 25. Weild & Kim, Market Structure. 
 26. EDWARD S. KNIGHT, SPURRING JOB GROWTH THROUGH CAPITAL FORMATION WHILE PROTECTING 
INVESTORS: HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 3 (Dec. 1, 2011) 
(written testimony) [hereinafter Written Testimony of Edward Knight]. 
 27. David Weild & Edward Kim, A Wake-Up Call for America, GRANT THORNTON: CAPITAL 
MARKET SERIES, 4 (Nov. 2009), http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies% 
20and %20capital%20markets/gtwakeupcall.pdf [hereinafter Weild & Kim, A Wake-Up]. 
 28. Id. at 26; Slideshow by the National Venture Capital Association, NVCA 4-Pillar Plan to 
Restore Liquidity in the U.S. Venture Capital Industry, NVCA (Apr. 29/30, 2009), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/NVCA/nvca-4pillar-plan-to-restore-liquidity-in-the-us-venture-
capital-indus-try-1360905. 
 29. Weild & Kim, A Wake-Up, supra note 27, at 26. 
 30. Id. at 26 exhibit 26. 
 31. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIAL 156 (6th ed. 2009). 
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agencies, which requires expensive legal, financial, and accounting 
services.  Second, private companies are easier to operate because 
boards of directors can make business decisions without having to get 
approval from public shareholders.  Third, when a company remains 
private, the board members can act without the risk of being voted out 
of their jobs by shareholders or losing their jobs by a hostile tender 
offer. 
In addition to the long-term financial and corporate governance 
considerations described above, conducting an IPO is extremely 
expensive.  In 2007, the estimated costs for a significant IPO were 
$600,000 to $800,000 in legal fees, $400,000 to $600,000 for auditor 
fees, $150,000 to $200,000 in printing costs, and various filing fees.32  
Underwriter commissions take a percent of the offering amount.33  
Furthermore, the senior officers will devote a significant amount of 
time to matters related to the offering instead of focusing on routine 
business activities.34
Upon recommending increasing the § 12(g) threshold, the House 
Committee on Financial Services articulated that the difficulty in 
borrowing coupled with the regulatory roadblocks for companies 
trying to enter the pubic markets has lead to an increased use of pre-
IPO equity financing.
 
35  As a result, there has been an expansion in the 
number of shareholders of record in pre-IPO companies.36  Therefore, 
the pre-JOBS Act § 12(g) requirements inhibited companies from 
accomplishing their financing needs without risking being required to 
register with the SEC, which they may not have be strategically or 
financially prepared to do.37
Although the Threshold Provision is well intended in its attempt 
to update § 12(g) to better reflect current market practices, this note 
argues that due to the way it is crafted, the Threshold Provision will 
have harmful unintended consequences.  These consequences include 
promoting a dysfunctional standard for the mandatory disclosure 
triggering requirements and reducing the number of companies 
conducting IPOs.  The later consequence will have the opposite 
intended effect of the JOBS Act legislation because it will hinder job 
creation and economic growth.  Part II explores the historical purpose 
of § 12(g) and how it became dysfunctional.  Part III discusses some of 
the arguments for updating § 12(g).  Part IV presents some of the 
unintended consequences of the Threshold Provision.  Finally, Part V 
 
 
 32. COX ET AL., supra note 31.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. H.R. REP. NO. 112-327, at 2. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
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recommends changes to § 12(g) that would help to avoid some of the 
unintended pitfalls of the Threshold Provision while creating a 
regulatory environment that encourages entrepreneurship, enables 
capital formation, and fosters job creation and economic growth. 
 
II.  THE HISTORIC CONTEXT OF SECTION 12(G) AND ITS FAILURE 
AS AN ACCURATE SIZE TEST 
 
A.  SECTION 12(G) WAS CREATED TO REGULATE THE OVER-THE-COUNTER 
SECURITIES MARKETS 
The securities laws were promulgated in response to the 
economic crisis resulting from the Great Depression.38  While many of 
the causes of the 1929 market crash were unrelated to abusive 
practices,39 evidence indicates that false and misleading information 
adversely affected the stock prices.40  Such abusive practices were in 
part a result of a lack of any laws requiring publicly traded firms to 
make public disclosures of material information, including financial 
reports.41  Additionally, investor interest had disappeared almost 
immediately in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929.42  For 
instance, at their high point in 1929 prior to the crash, New York Stock 
Exchange listed securities had a total value of $89 billion, and their 
value dipped to $15 billion by 1932.43  Therefore, because there had 
been market fraud preceding the Great Depression, and a significant 
amount of investors withdrew their capital during the Great 
Depression, there was a pressing need to eliminate fraud and 
reinvigorate investor confidence in the public markets.44
In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, recommending the 
federal regulation of investment securities, President Roosevelt wrote: 
 
There is . . . an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new 
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by 
full publicity and information, and that no essentially important 
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying 
public.  This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the 
 
 38. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39 (3d ed. 2003). 
 39. For example, speculative investor frenzy and significant amounts of margin trading 
played a substantial role in causing the crash.  COX ET AL., supra note 31, at 5. 
 40. Id. at 6. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 5. 
 43. Id. 
 44. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 277 
(1991). 
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further doctrine ‘let the seller also beware.’  It puts the burden of 
telling the whole truth on the seller.  It should give impetus to honest 
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.45
Two bodies of law were enacted to regulate the securities 
industry: the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.  The 1933 Act operates to 
protect investors in primary distributions of securities, while the 1934 
Act regulates trading markets and their participants.
 
46
Since their enactment, the cornerstone of the federal securities 
laws has been mandatory disclosure.
 
47  The primary and longstanding 
mission of the SEC is to compel firms involved in the securities markets 
to disclose data, and thereby indirectly induce them to avoid illegal or 
embarrassing activities.48  Mandatory disclosure is generally regarded 
as the appropriate way to regulate corporate finance.49  Based on the 
philosophy of mandatory disclosure, the current formulation of the 
1934 Act mandates continuous disclosure for three categories of 
companies: (1) companies that have securities listed on a national 
exchange; (2) companies that meet the requirements of § 12(g); and 
(3) companies that have an effective 1933 Act registration statement.50
1.  A Case for Mandatory Disclosure 
  
This note addresses what the rationale is for forcing private companies 
to report material information to the public, and what the criteria 
under § 12(g) should be for doing so.  To frame the discussion, it is 
important to understand some the benefits of mandatory disclosure as 
well as the context in which the SEC created § 12(g). 
The policy of mandatory disclosure was not originally aimed at 
having a significant regulatory effect on the economy.51  Rather, 
President Roosevelt approached mandatory disclosure as a mechanism 
for stymieing the deleterious behavior of Wall Street insiders by 
exposing their activities to public scrutiny.52  Roosevelt was influenced 
by, and often cited to, the regulatory philosophy articulated by Justice 
Brandeis that, “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
electric light the most efficient policeman.”53
 
 45. S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6–7 (1933). 
  Nonetheless, mandatory 
disclosure has also come to be viewed as a valuable mechanism for 
 46. COX ET AL.,  supra note 31, at 7. 
 47. Id. 
 48. SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 39–40. 
 49. Id. at 40.  For a more complete discussion of the rationales for mandatory disclosure see 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 276–314. 
 50. COX ET AL., supra note 31, at 7–8. 
 51. SELIGMAN, supra note 38 at 39–40. 
 52. Id. at 41. 
 53. Id. at 41–42. 
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regulating the overall economy because it “improves the ‘allocative 
efficiency’ of the capital market.”54
Mandatory disclosure creates economic efficiency because, in 
effect, society is subsidizing “search costs to secure both a greater 
quantity of information and a better testing of its accuracy.”
 
55  As a 
result, society gains equal access to information, without which 
investors would spend time and money trying to beat the market.56  In 
the aggregate, the time investors would spend trying to search out 
information to beat the market would be very costly.  Therefore, 
“investors as a group gain if firms disclose so as to minimize the 
opportunities for these gains and thus the incentives to search.”57
Another important economic benefit to mandatory disclosure is 
that by disclosing information, firms gain more investors.  They do so 
because, by reducing investors’ information costs, investors increase 
the net returns on their investments: 
  The 
time and money, which would otherwise be spent searching for 
information, can be spent on other endeavors. 
The net return on a security is its gross return (dividends plus any 
liquidating distribution) less the costs of information and 
transaction in holding the security.  A firm can increase this net 
return as easily by reducing the cost of holding the stock as by 
increasing its business profits.  Firms that promise to make 
disclosures for this purpose will prosper relative to others, because 
their investors incur relatively lower costs and can be more passive 
with safety.58
Theoretically, this logic indicates that companies have a business 
incentive to voluntarily disclose, and therefore mandating disclosure is 
not necessary.  However, in reality, there are several factors that 
change the equation and necessitate mandatory disclosure. 
 
Mandatory disclosure is necessary because it has been shown that 
a company will only voluntarily disclose all its information if three 
assumptions are satisfied: (1) investors know that companies have 
particular information; (2) companies cannot lie; and (3) disclosure is 
costless.59
 
 54. John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 
VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984). 
  For example, if the cost of disclosure outweighs the benefit 
to the company, or if disclosure is not economically feasible, then the 
company will either choose not to disclose or to only partially disclose 
 55. Coffee, supra note 54.  
 56. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 287. 
 57. Id. at 290. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market 18 (ECGI Law Working Paper 
No. 21/2004), available at http://www.cgscenter.com/library/CorpGovCompValue/ 
CostbenefitofFinMarket Evaluation.pdf.  
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the information.60  Alternatively, if the company has information it 
knows will negatively impact the stock value, but knows that the public 
will not find out about it, then it will not voluntarily disclose such 
negative information.61  Although a company will generally benefit 
from disclosure, it will only disclose enough information it can 
internalize a benefit from.62  Because, as the above examples show, 
there are social benefits to disclosure that companies cannot 
internalize, companies will not be incentivized to provide a socially 
optimal amount of information.63
In sum, the policy of mandatory disclosure has numerous social 
and economic benefits.  These factors are important to take into 
account when balancing the interest of private companies in not 
registering with the public interest of requiring companies to register.  
Part II.A(2) discusses the historic context for the creation of § 12(g) 
and SEC’s rationale for the § 12(g) technical requirements. 
  Therefore, it is necessary to mandate 
disclosure. 
2.   The Origin of Section 12(g) 
Section 12(g) was adopted in 1964 based primarily on a 
congressionally commissioned SEC study (“the Study”)64 concluding 
that securities traded on over-the-counter-markets (“OTC”), i.e., 
nonreporting securities exchanges, should, in a limited fashion, be 
brought under the purview of the SEC.65  The Study reviewed the 
efficacy of the regulatory scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in order 
“to strengthen the mechanisms facilitating the free flow of capital into 
the markets and to raise the standards of investor protection, thus 
preserving and enhancing the level of investor confidence.”66  As part 
of the study, the SEC surveyed every case of fraud under the 1933 and 
1934 Acts, either in litigation or otherwise, that came before the SEC in 
a period of eighteen months beginning in January 1961.67  Ninety-three 
percent of the 107 broker dealer revocation cases reviewed involved 
issuers of securities that were not subject to the continuous reporting 
requirements of the 1934 Act.68
 
 60. Zingales, supra note 59.   
  Furthermore, numerous reports 
indicated that companies trading OTC and not subject to the 
registration and reporting requirements of the 1934 Act were either 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 19. 
 63. Zingales, supra note 59, at 19. 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 15 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027; 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78l(g) (West 2011). 
 65. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 60–64 (1963). 
 66. Id. at iv. 
 67. Id. at 10. 
 68. Id. 
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making no disclosures to their investors, or their disclosures were 
generally inadequate to the point of being misleading.69
The Study determined that to the extent that companies have 
“traded over-the-counter issues outstanding are allowed to operate in 
the dark, the very conditions that encourage a resort to fraud and 
manipulation are fostered”
 
70  Therefore, the basic principles for 
establishing investor protections for listed securities are equally 
applicable to the OTC market.71  For the reasons discussed below, the 
SEC’s solution was to require companies of a certain size to register 
and report periodically with the SEC.72
Based on data gathered from 1,618 companies listed in the OTC 
markets, the SEC determined what the appropriate benchmark would 
be for requiring private companies to register.
 
73  The participants 
included 96 insurance companies, 358 banks, and 1,164 industrial and 
other corporations.74  Of these, 1,610 provided their number of 
shareholders.75  The shareholder numbers were established in terms of 
record holdings, as opposed to beneficial shareholders.76
The study found a positive correlation between the number of 
record shareholders and the number of transfers of record.
  This is an 
important distinction in the development of § 12(g).  Record 
shareholders are people or entities listed on the corporate record of 
the security, whereas the beneficial owners are those who own the 
shares in equity even though the legal title belongs to the record 
holder.  For example, the record owner may have sold divisions of 
shares to numerous people who would not be listed on the corporate 
record of the security. 
77  That is, 
companies with a larger number of record shareholders saw higher 
trading volumes.78  The study ideally would have looked at trading 
volumes in terms of actual trades, as opposed to transfers of record, 
because significantly more transactions would have occurred without 
the record actually transferring.79  However, trading volumes were 
unavailable, and an attempt to obtain them was not feasible.80
 
 69. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 10–17. 
  
Therefore, the number of record transfers was the next best indicator 
 70. Id. at 10. 
 71. Id. at 7. 
 72. Id. at 62.  
 73. Id. at 19, 36. 
 74. Id. at 19. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 20. 
 77. Id. at 20–23. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 20 n.44. 
 80. Id. 
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of market activity.81  Likewise, the ideal criteria for forcing a firm into 
the purview of the SEC would have been based on trading volumes 
because market activity would have been the best benchmark for 
determining the risk of investor fraud.82  However, the study notes that 
criteria based on market activity would not have been workable in 
practice, and the number of shareholders of record is “at least a rough, 
indirect measure of market activity.”83  Presumably, this is because 
there were no available records of trading volumes of over-the-counter 
issues, and it would have been extremely burdensome for the SEC to 
keep track of the number of record transfers taking place.84
The Study found that the level of trading activity, based on record 
transfers became significant for companies with 300 or more 
shareholders.
 
85  Moreover, over half of the surveyed companies had 
300 or more shareholders of record.86  In light of the data, the study 
recommended extending the 1934 Act’s disclosure, proxy, and insider 
trading provisions to companies with 300 or more shareholders.87  The 
ultimate determination of a 500 shareholder threshold was a 
compromise between the SEC, who wanted the threshold to be 300 
shareholders, and members of the investment banking industry who 
wanted the threshold set at 1,000 shareholders.88
B.  THE 500 SHAREHOLDER THRESHOLD BECAME A FLAWED SIZE TEST 
 
The 500-shareholder limit is roughly a size test.89  As discussed in 
Part II.A(2), the study determined that companies of a certain size (in 
terms of the number of record shareholders) traded at higher volumes 
in the OTC markets, and, therefore, they should be accountable to their 
shareholders and the public.90
 
 81. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 20 n.44. 
  Since its creation in 1964, the 500-
shareholder metric has become dysfunctional because many 
 82. Id. at 34.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 34. 
 86. Id. at 32.  Additionally, the Study states, “it is clear also that under any definition of 
‘public’ for purposes of protection of the securities laws, a company with 300 or more 
shareholders of record is to be deemed public.”  Id. at 34. 
 87. Id at 62; SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 314. 
 88. SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 315. 
 89. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT & ROBERT B. THOMSON, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities 
Regulation, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23) (on file with authors). 
 90. See H.R. DOC. NO. 95 88-95, at 60–61.  The SEC has the power under § 12(g)(5) to define 
“held of record” as it sees necessary or appropriate in the public interest or to protect investors 
against the circumvention of the provisions of § 12(g).  15 U.S.C § 78l (g)(5) (West 2012).  The 
Commission utilized this power to define “held of record” in SEC Release No. 34-7426 (1964).  See 
Exchange Act Release No. 7426 (proposed Sept. 14, 1964), Exchange Act Release No.  7492 (1965) 
(adoption). 
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extraordinarily large companies (in terms of total assets) have few 
enough record shareholders to be able to avoid registering.91  
Furthermore, many publicly traded companies have less than 500 
record shareholders and less than $10 million of assets, but they have 
thousands of beneficial holders.92
When the SEC conducted the Study, they based their data on 
shareholders of record and not beneficial record holders.
  As explained further below, these 
publicly traded companies can choose to delist with the SEC even 
though they have thousands of publicly traded shares outstanding. 
93  They noted 
in their report that the data presumed an understated number of 
beneficial record holders.94  However, this disparity has since 
dramatically increased because publicly traded shares are no longer 
recorded in the names of individual owners.95  Rather, broker-dealers 
“hold vast numbers of shares of vast numbers of investors under a 
single name.”96  This practice developed as a practical matter to cut the 
massive flow of paper and the costs of transferring stock that resulted 
from increased trading volumes.97  Because high speed trading 
requires that securities are easily transferrable, as a matter of practice, 
broker-dealers do not require the transfer of certificates every time 
beneficial ownership changes.98  Currently, it is “unusual for a 
beneficial owner to appear on the corporate books as a holder of 
record or hold a stock certificate.”99  For example, a company with a 
public float of $1 billion and 2,500 beneficial shareholders may still 
have fewer than 500 shareholders of record.100
Consequently, the failure of the § 12(g) as a size test has enabled 
hundreds of companies to go dark.  A company goes dark when it 
deregisters its publicly traded securities with the SEC, yet continues to 




 91. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 23; JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS 
FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: CAPITAL FORMATION, JOB CREATION AND CONGRESS: 
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC MARKETS BEFORE THE SEC 13–14 (Nov. 17, 2011) (written testimony) 
[hereinafter Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr.]. 
  Companies that deregister with the SEC are 
 92. Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of 
Voluntary SEC Deregistrations 1 (University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business, 
Working Paper No. RHS-06-045), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstractid= 592421. 
 93. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 20. 
 94. Id. 
 95. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 24. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 15. 
 99. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, et al., Petition for Commission Action to Require Exchange Act 
Registration of Over-the-Counter Equity Securities, U.S. SEC (July 3, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/petitions/petn4-483.htm. 
 100. Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14. 
 101. See generally Leuz et al., supra note 92 (referring to the Abstract). 
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described as having gone dark because, after they deregister, the 
insiders of the company typically refuse to disclose any information to 
public investors.102  Under § 12(g)(4), a company may voluntarily 
terminate registration ninety days after the issuer files a certificate 
with the Commission showing that the number of record shareholders 
is fewer than three hundred persons.103  The company may also 
voluntarily terminate registration if it has 500 holders of record but 
less than $10 million of assets in each of the prior three years 
preceding the deregistration request.104  Furthermore, companies with 
more than 300 shareholders of record can bring the number of record 
shareholders below 300 by engineering a reverse stock split or a 
repurchase tender offer.105
Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, and Tracy Wang conducted a 
study (“Leuz Study”) analyzing a sample of approximately 480 firms 
that went dark between 1998 and 2004.
 
106  The Leuz Study revealed 
interesting insight about the going dark phenomena.  The Leuz Study 
companies had an average of $90.96 million in assets, with a median of 
$3.36 million, and an average of $25.19 million in market value, with a 
median of 3.96 million.107  The study does not report the number of 
beneficial record holders for each company.  However, to put it in 
perspective, many of the companies that have gone dark had 
significant assets and more than 300 beneficial shareholders.108  For 
example, when United Road Services went dark in 2003, it had 
approximately over 6,000 beneficial shareholders and $97,767,000 in 
total assets.109  Once deregistered, fewer than 10 percent of the Leuz 
Study companies disclosed financial statements and even fewer were 
audited.110  The main motivation for companies to go dark was the high 
cost of reporting.111  By in large, the Leuz study found that “smaller 
firms with relatively poor performance and low growth, for which 
reporting costs are particularly burdensome, are more likely to go 
dark, as are firms in the period following the passage of [the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002].”112
On average there was a negative stock price reaction of -10 
 
 
 102. Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 136 (2009). 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (g)(4) (West 2012). 
 104. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99. 
 105. Fried, supra note 102, at 141. 
 106. Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 2. 
 107. Id. at 51–52. 
 108. Fried, supra note 102, at 145. 
 109. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99. 
 110. Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 33. 
 111. Id. at 2. 
 112. Id. 
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percent to firms’ decision to go dark.113  The negative reaction may be 
explained in two ways.  First, the market’s strong negative reaction 
may be attributed to shareholders inferring that the company’s future 
growth prospects have diminished, even though the decision to go 
dark may help the company trim administrative costs and thus 
maximize value.114  Second, the negative reaction could be explained by 
agency costs, because the negative market reaction reflects an 
anticipated increase in private control benefits.115  These private 
control benefits may include the managers’ ability to hide poor 
performances that would otherwise lead to their dismissal, or 
protection against legal liability. 116
Not only do companies that go dark experience a negative market 
reaction, but going dark also increases the likelihood that investor 
fraud and other manipulative behavior may take place.  The SEC warns 
that stocks traded “in the OTC market are generally among the most 
risky and most susceptible to manipulation.”
 
117  When investors are 
deprived of periodic reporting under the 1934 Act, the stocks trade on 
“rumor, innuendo and uncertainty.”118  The informational asymmetry 
and increased volatility leaves investors susceptible to the 
unscrupulous behavior of insiders who are well positioned to deprive 
investors of the remaining value of their investments.119
The Threshold Provision did not change the requirements that 




  Nonetheless, the problem of 
companies going dark demonstrates the serious inadequacy of using 
the number of record holders as a benchmark for a company’s size.  
The Threshold Provision will only promulgate this flawed standard.  
Additionally, the issue of companies going dark reflects the perils of 
discretionary reporting because it demonstrates that when the costs of 
reporting outweigh the benefits, companies will not report.  Moreover, 
reporting is needed to protect investors against fraud precisely in the 
situations where it is not desirable for a company to report.  Therefore, 
a different standard is necessary for determining when registration 
should be mandated. 
 
 113. Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 2. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Pump&Dump.com: Tips for Avoiding Stock Scams on the Internet, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec. 
gov/investor/pubs/pump.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 118. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99, at 6. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The JOBS Act increases the deregistration threshold in the case of banks or a bank holding 
companies to 1,200 persons.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012). 
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III.   ARGUMENTS FOR UPDATING SECTION 12(G) 
 
In early December, a group of thirty eight executives and 
investors, including Twitter CEO Dick Costolo and Gilt CEO Kevin Ryan 
wrote a letter to Congress in support of the JOBS Act, stating that 
“‘[t]he 500 shareholder rule is outdated, overly restrictive, and limits 
U.S. job creation and American global competitiveness.’”121  Proponents 
of the Act proffered two changes to the startup landscape that support 
overhauling § 12(g).  First, unlike the companies of 1964, the pay 
structures in current startups generally involve giving employees stock 
options.122  However, to stay within the 500 record holder threshold, 
companies are faced with the choice of limiting the number of 
employees they hire, the number of new investors they take on, or 
their ability to acquire other businesses for stock.123  Second, the 
emergence of secondary markets, such as Sharespost and 
SecondMarket, has created an alternative liquidity opportunity for 
investors and employees.124  Arguably, these secondary markets 
encourage more private investment in startups because they provide 
confidence for early stage investors that they will have multiple exit 
options.125
A. EMPLOYEE EQUITY COMPENSATION 
  I will address these two matters separately. 
Upon introducing the Act, Representative David Schweikert 
explained, “‘[i]f a company is really growing, it could start to hit its 
500-shareholder limit just from its employee base.’”126  Notably, the 
500-shareholder threshold contributed to the IPO’s of Microsoft, 
Google, and Facebook.127
 
 121. Douglas MacMillan & Joshua Gallu, Twitter, Gilt CEOs Fight SEC’s 500-Shareholder Rule for 
Startups, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ news/2011-
12-14/twitter-gilt-ceos-fight-sec-s-500-shareholder-rule-for-startups.html. 
  Although the use of equity compensation has 
 122. BARRY E. SILBERT, LEGIS. PROPOSALS TO FACILITATE SMALL BUS. CAPITAL FORMATION AND JOB 
CREATION: HEARING BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV. 14  (Sept. 21, 2011) (written testimony), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/092111silbert.pdf [hereinafter 
Written Testimony of Barry Silbert]. 
 123. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122. 
 124. ERIC KOESTER, THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL FORMATION: HEARING BEFORE H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT 
AND GOV’T REFORM 7 (May 10, 2011) (written testimony), available at http:// 
democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/FULLCOM/510%20future%20of%20cap%20for
m/Koester%20-%20House%20Oversight%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Written Testimony of 
Eric Koester]. 
 125. See Written Testimony of Eric Koester, supra note 124, at 7; see Written Testimony of Barry 
Silbert, supra note 122, at 7. 
 126. Deborah Gage, Bill Aims to Loosen Private-Company Stock Rules, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (June 14, 
2011 6:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/06/14/read-the-bill-designed-to-
loosen-private-stock-rules. 
 127. Peter Lattman, Share Rules Could Prompt an Offering by Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
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been problematic for some companies, the argument that a company’s 
employee base is a major threat to a company’s record shareholder 
count is a bit misleading for two reasons.  First, it is not commonplace 
for companies to be forced to go public due to § 12(g).  Second, not all 
employee equity holders are counted towards the § 12(g) threshold. 
First, it is uncommon for companies to be forced to go public due 
to reaching the § 12(g) threshold.128  Given that thousands of publicly 
traded companies have fewer than 300 record holders, or 500 record 
holders and less than $10 million in assets at the end of their three 
most recent fiscal years,129 it is likely that many companies have less 
than 500 shareholders of record at the time they enter the public 
markets.  For example, at the time of its IPO, Amazon.com, Inc. 
reported having seventy-six record holders of its common stock.130
Second, the SEC has already carved out exceptions to § 12(g) for 
certain employee benefits plans, including stock options.  In 1965, the 
SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-1(a), which exempts employee 
stock from the provisions of § 12(g).
 
131  Then, in 1988, the SEC adopted 
Rule 701,132 which provides an issuer exemption to the 1934 Act 
registration requirements for securities offerings in compensatory 
benefits plans.133  In the 1980’s private non-reporting companies 
began compensating employees with stock options to attract and 
motivate employees.134  As the practice grew from 1990 until 2006, a 
number of companies exceeded the  
§ 12(g) 500 shareholder threshold due to issuing stock options.135
 
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/focus-on-private-shares-could-push-a-public-
offering/; Primack, supra note 11. 
  In 
 128. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 42. 
 129. See Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 14–15. 
 130. Amazon.com, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1 Registration Statement Under The 
Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1/A) 59 (May 14, 1997).  Note, Amazon.com, Inc. did not report 
the number of record holders of its preferred stock. 
 131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1(a) (West 2012) (“[a]ny interest or participation in an employee 
stock bonus, stock purchase, profit sharing, pension, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings or 
similar plan which is not transferable by the holder except in the event of death or mental 
incompetency, or any security issued solely to fund such plans.”). 
 132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (West 2012). 
 133. Id. § 230.701(c) (West 2012) (exempting registration requirements for securities 
offerings in compensatory benefits plans to “employees, directors, general partners, trustees 
(where the issuer is a business trust), officers, or consultants and advisors, and their family 
members who acquire such securities from such persons through gifts or domestic relations 
orders”). 
 134. U.S. SEC, RELEASE NO. 34-56887, EXEMPTION OF COMPENSATORY EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS FROM 
REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12(G) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 5–6 (2007). 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 4 n.7 (citing the “no-action letters to Starbucks Corporation (available Apr. 
2, 1992); Kinko’s, Inc. (available Nov. 30, 1999); Mitchell International Holding, Inc. (available 
Dec. 27, 2000) (“Mitchell International”); AMIS Holdings, Inc. (available Jul. 30, 2001) (“AMIS 
Holdings”); Headstrong Corporation (available Feb. 28, 2003); and VG Holding Corporation 
(available Oct. 31, 2006) (“VG Holding”)). 
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response to a series of no-action letters exempting these companies 
from the § 12(g) requirements, on December 10, 2007, the SEC 
amended the §12h-1 to exempt stock options for issuers not subject to 
the Exchange Act’s reporting requirements.136
Despite the SEC’s carve outs for employee equity compensation, a 
company’s employee base can still contribute to the § 12(g) threshold 
because the SEC’s exemption of stock options from § 12(g) does not 
apply to securities issued upon the exercise of a stock option.
 
137  The 
standard vesting time period used by startup companies for founders 
and non-founders employee stock options is four years.138  Because, in 
the new IPO market, companies may take nearly a decade to go public, 
option holders are often fully vested and may exercise their options 
before the IPO event.139  If the employees exercise their options, they 
are counted as shareholders of record for purpose of § 12(g).140  As a 
result, § 12(g) discourages companies fearful of reaching the 500 
shareholder threshold from hiring more employees and providing 
equity-based compensation.141
B.  SECONDARY MARKETS 
  Furthermore, as explained in the Part 
III.B, with the rise of secondary markets for trading private equity, 
option holders may be increasingly inclined to exercise their options 
prior to an IPO. 
Changing the § 12(g) threshold had considerable support from 
proponents of secondary market exchanges.142  Trading on the private 
markets has increased dramatically in recent years.143
 
 136. U.S. SEC, RELEASE NO. 34-56887, supra note 134, at 4–5. 
  In 2010, the 
 137. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122, at 12. 
 138. Doug Collom, Vesting of Founders’ Stock: Beyond the Basics, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S REPORT: 
PRIVATE COMPANY FINANCING TRENDS (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, CA.), Spring 
2008, at 9, available at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/vftrends0608.pdf. 
 139. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122, at 12. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122, at 12. 
 142. See id.  It is important to note that there is some skepticism about the sustainability of the 
secondary markets in the wake of the Facebook IPO, which was the most actively traded company 
on the private markets by a wide margin.  Elevelyn Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That 
Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/losing-
the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg/.  Moreover, Zynga, Groupon, and LinkedIn were each 
companies that were widely traded on private exchanges and recently went public.  Id.  
Nonetheless, representatives of the private exchanges believe that there is room to grow and that 
other companies will emerge and fill the void created by the Facebook, and other recent, IPOs.  Id.  
For instance, Gregg Brogger, the president and founder of SharesPost stated, “We certainly expect 
a reduction in revenue, but we also expect some companies like DropBox to step in . . . .  Venture 
capitalists always have another generation of new start-ups, and our market will as well.”  Id. 
 143. Steven Russolillo, Public Problem: Private Markets Grapple With Tech IPOs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504576655311056016704. 
html. 
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value of all private share transactions was $4.6 billion, an increase 
from the $2.4 billion in 2009.144  These numbers were estimated to 
keep increasing.145  Eric Koester, former securities lawyer and current 
chief operating officer of startup company Zaarly, explained that from 
entrepreneurs’ perspective, the private markets are beneficial because 
they offer an alternative option for providing liquidity to employees 
and investors in late stage businesses that are not ready to sell their 
companies or enter the public markets.146
At a time when companies are taking longer to IPO due to 
increasing costs of public company compliance and offerings, the 
secondary markets provide confidence for early stage investors that 
they will be able to exit.
 
147  They also provide greater visibility and 
market pricing into the valuation of the business.148
However, there is skepticism about the public benefit of these 
secondary markets and increasing the § 12(g) to enable them.  For 
example, Professor John Coffee argues that increasing the § 12(g) 
threshold primarily serves the interests of the private equity brokers 
without creating new jobs.
  In this sense, they 
create an onramp for the ultimate goal of going public.  Companies 
benefit from this new onramp because they can have a longer period to 
mature before going public, and insiders and investors seeking short 
term liquidity can access it on the secondary markets.  The 500 record 
shareholder threshold hinders this process because it forces 
companies out into the public markets when they would otherwise 
benefit from a longer incubation period. 
149  Professor Coffee explains that increasing 
the § 12(g) threshold allows private equity brokers “to service not just 
small companies as they grow, but much larger companies that are 
discouraging their shareholders from holding record ownership.”150  
Therefore, raising the § 12(g) threshold exclusively benefits those 
seeking to avoid the § 12(g) requirements.151
Additionally, a rule that generates more trading in the secondary 
markets could increase the likelihood of fraud and reduce investor 
confidence in the public markets.  The emergence of the private equity 
trading platforms has been described as creating a “situation not-
unlike the pre-1964 period in which there are companies with widely-
traded secondary shares which are outside of the periodic disclosure 
 
 
 144. Russolillo, supra note 143.   
 145. Id. 
 146. Written Testimony of Eric Koester, supra note 124, at 7. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Written Testimony of Eric Koester, supra note 124, at 7. 
 149. Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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requirements of the 1934 Act.”152  Granted, private trading on the 
secondary markets is different than the OTC markets of the pre-1964 
period because trading occurs between investors who are deemed 
accredited under the securities laws.153  Nevertheless, there are doubts 
about whether accredited investors are effective at fending for 
themselves.154  If it is true that accredited investors are ineffective at 
fending for themselves, then increasing liquidity in the public markets 
may only exacerbate the problem because it will allow them more 
opportunities to trade.  As a result, the Act would defeat the original 
purpose of § 12(g), which was to require companies of a certain size 
and with substantial trading volumes to be “‘public’ for purposes of 
protection of the securities laws.”155
 
 
IV.   POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT 
 
Despite proponents of the Threshold Provision arguing that the § 
12(g) 500 shareholder threshold impedes capital formation,156 the 
Threshold Provision will have unintended consequences, including 
decreasing the number of companies going public.157  The decrease will 
inhibit capital formation and job growth because a majority of job 
growth occurs after a company goes public whereby it experiences a 
large influx of capital that it can use to expand business and hire more 
employees.158
 When the markets are robust, “efficient pricing and funding of 
entrepreneurial activity” occurs.
  Having a lower threshold for mandatory disclosure 
forces more companies into the public markets, which helps to 
maintain robust public markets.  
159  For example, companies that have 
a price set on the open market attract more investors, while those that 
are not on the open markets are traded at a discount of 30 percent or 
more.160  When a company is able to raise capital more efficiently, job 
growth occurs more rapidly.161
 
 152. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 17. 
  And, the efficient allocation of 
 153. See Do I have to be an Accredited Investor to join SecondMarket?, SECONDMARKET, 
http://support.secondmarket.com/entries/481382-do-i-have-to-be-an-accredited-investor-to-
join-second market (last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
 154. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 32.  
 155. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 34. 
 156. H.R. Rep. No. 112-327, at 2 (2011). 
 157. Deborah Gage, supra note 126. 
 158. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 5. 
 159. Written Testimony of Edward Knight, supra note 26, at 3. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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resources creates a more productive economy.162
Mandatory disclosure may also be in the best interest of 
companies for capital formation because firms that choose to go public 
benefit from lower capital costs.  When a company discloses 
information to investors, it will prosper relative to others because 
investors incur lower costs for searching out information on which to 
base their investments.
  In that regard, 
legislation should encourage companies to go public to allow the 
market to allocate capital to the best performing companies so they 
can create long lasting economic growth. 
163  However, as discussed in Part II, companies 
generally are not incentivized to disclose information because they do 
not internalize all of the social benefits derived from it.164
Policies that strengthen the public markets also benefit the public 
at large by enabling democratic ownership and the rewards that come 
with it.
  As such, 
firms generally will provide less information than it is socially optimal.  
Therefore, without mandatory disclosure, companies will under 
produce information.  Nonetheless, if the purpose of the Act is to 
reinvigorate the economy and enable job growth, a law that creates 
strong incentives for companies to stay private will not accomplish 
that goal.  Congress should work to make the public markets more 
attractive for startups as opposed to creating a superficial fix that 
allows startups to avoid the public markets.  
165  When IPOs are delayed, the numbers of pre-IPO financing 
rounds increase, and by the time that the public gets access to shares, 
there is less upside.166  The IPO market is already seeing this trend.  For 
example, for companies such as Microsoft (IPO in 1986), Cisco (IPO in 
1990), and Amazon (IPO in 1997), public investors participated in 99 
percent of the terminal value of the company.167  However, in more 
recent technology IPOs, private investors accrued most of the terminal 
value.  For example, Google’s pre-IPO value was $40 billion and 
Facebook’s was $70 billion.168
In part, tech companies are staying private longer because they 
are able to raise huge financing rounds in what have been referred to 




 162. Written Testimony of Edward Knight, supra note 26, at 3. 
  If companies are able 
 163. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 290. 
 164. Id. at 287; Zingales, supra note 59, at 19.   
 165. Written Testimony of Edward Knight, supra note 26, at 3. 
 166. Erick Schonfeld, Tech IPOs Just Ain’t What they Used to Be, AOL TECH. (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/12/19/tech-ipos-bleh/. 
 167. William Quigley, A Venture Capital Revival Is Upon Us (Mar. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.slideshare.net/quigleyreport/quigley-report-a-venture-capital-revival-is-upon-us; 
Schonfeld, supra note 165. 
 168. Quigley, supra note 167. 
 169. Schonfeld, supra note 166. 
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to easily raise pre-IPO capital and have liquidity in the secondary 
markets, they may be incentivized to stay private longer.  As a result, 
public investor confidence may diminish, and divestment of the public 
markets may occur.  Additionally, more companies may seek to list 
their stocks on foreign exchanges.170  Divestment resulting from lack of 
investor confidence is an issue that the enactment of § 12(g) sought to 
tackle in the first place.171
In sum, although increasing the § 12(g) mandatory registration 
threshold has some benefits, that are drawbacks.  The downsides 
include increasing the time companies remain private and reducing the 
number of companies that conduct IPOs.  Part V recommends changes 
to § 12(g) that would help reconcile the needs of private companies 
with the policy objectives of mandatory disclosure. 
  Therefore, creating legislation that increases 
the likelihood of public divestment runs contrary to public policy. 
 
V.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
In light of failure of § 12 (g) as an accurate size test and the 
changes to the market landscape since § 12 (g) was originally enacted, 
a new regulatory approach should be adopted.  As discussed in Part II, 
significantly raising the shareholder of record threshold promotes an 
inaccurate size test that allows companies to have large numbers of 
beneficial shareholders without being subject to the reporting 
requirements of the 1934 Act.172  However, when adopted, the SEC did 
not contemplate that that the 500-shareholder threshold would force 
private companies with illiquid stock to go public.  The SEC simply 
sought to reign in OTC trading.173  Nevertheless, the rise of the 
secondary markets has lead to a situation that is similar to the pre-
1964 period when shares of nonreporting companies were widely 
traded.174
 
 170. See Written Testimony of Edward S. Knight, supra note 26, at 3. 
  Therefore, the § 12(g) mandatory disclosure rules should be 
modified in order to balance the burdens on private companies—
which should not have to make a decision between hiring more 
employees or going public—with the public interest benefits of 
 171. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at iv. 
 172. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & ADOLF A. BERLE, SPURRING JOB GROWTH THROUGH CAPITAL FORMATION 
WHILE PROTECTING INVESTORS: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND 
URBAN AFFAIRS 12–13 (Dec. 1, 2011) (written testimony), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a96c1b
c1-b06 4-4b01-a8ad-11e86438c7e5.  The current framework enables companies to go dark even 
though they have over 500 beneficial shareholders.  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 173. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 10. 
 174. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 17. 
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mandatory disclosure.  To that end, in order to fit with the original 
purpose of §12(g), Congress should change the § 12(g) size standard to 
better reflect trading volume and beneficial ownership. 
Several alternatives to using the number of record shareholders 
as a threshold have been suggested.175  These include, counting the 
number of beneficial shareholders, or moving to a public float or 
market capitalization approach.176
A.  BENEFICIAL SHAREHOLDERS, PUBLIC FLOAT, OR MARKET CAP APPROACHES 
  Either one of these would improve 
upon the current approach.  However, because the shareholders of 
private and public companies are inherently different, as are the 
markets in which they trade, meaningful regulation of the two can be 
accomplished by creating a size test that reflects trading volume using 
distinct criteria for the private and public spheres. 
Either a standard based on beneficial shareholders, public float, or 
market capitalization would be an improvement to § 12 (g) mandatory 
disclosure benchmark.177  However, these approaches are not ideal.  
First, by looking at the number of beneficial shareholders as a 
benchmark for size, Congress could increase the pre-IPO shareholder 
threshold that triggers mandatory disclosure and alleviate the 
Facebook problem.178
Second, under a public float or market capitalization test, the SEC 
would look to the value of the shares outstanding by nonaffiliates of 
the company.
  Simultaneously, basing the rule on beneficial 
ownership would prevent public companies with large numbers of 
beneficial shareholders from going dark.  However, while the 
technology is likely available to track beneficial ownership in the 
public markets, it may be difficult to do so in the private setting 
because private companies are less regulated, and companies may 
have difficulty tracking indirect holdings by way of institutional 
investors.  Therefore, in the private setting, record ownership is a more 
practical approach because companies can more easily maintain 
records of who has title to the securities. 
179  In effect, this would correlate more appropriately 
with notions of creating an efficient market.180
 
 175. Changing the size test is not an innovative concept.  It has been recommended numerous 
times.  See, e.g., Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14; LANGEVOORT & 
THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 41; Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99. 
  Additionally, it would 
limit large companies from being able to go dark.  However, market 
capitalization could not be used as a threshold for private companies 
 176. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99; Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 
91, at 14; LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 41. 
 177. LANGEVOORT & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 41. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14. 
 180. Id. 
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because, without a competitive marketplace, it would be difficult to 
accurately calculate the value of outstanding securities. 
B.  A TWO-TIERED APPROACH 
Given that the private markets and public markets are inherently 
different, they should be regulated in different ways.  Therefore, a two-
tiered approach could be used that measures the size of private 
companies and public companies based on different criteria.  When 
companies are private, the mandatory registration threshold could be 
defined by both the number of record shareholders and trading 
volume.   
 For the private sphere, the 500 record shareholder limit could be 
increased to allow businesses to make hiring and acquisition decisions 
without worrying about triggering the registration requirement.  In 
order to protect investors, the record shareholder increase could be 
offset by restricting the volume of private trading.  Just as the SEC’s 
1964 Study based its size test on the correlation between the number 
of shareholders and companies’ trading volumes,181 § 12(g) could be 
changed to reflect the volume of stocks trading on the secondary 
markets.  For example, privately traded companies could trade until a 
certain volume limit, at which point they could be required to go 
public.  This would enable a larger incubation period while minimizing 
the risk of fraud.  Once in the public sphere, Congress could determine 
whether a company can delist by setting a size limit based on beneficial 
ownership, public float, or market capitalization.182  This would help 
avoid the issue of large companies with a significant number of 






 181. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 34. 
 182. See LANGEVOORT & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 41.  For companies that have gone public, a 
size limit based on either beneficial, public float, or market capitalization would suffice.  For the 
purpose of my argument, conceptually, what is important is that the standards are different for 
private companies and public companies. 
 183. At the time of the Study, using criteria based on market activity would not have been 
workable in practice.  H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 34.  However, with modern technology criteria based 
on market activity seems practical.  With hi-tech trading platforms such as SecondMarket, it 
should not be overly burdensome to calculate the trading volumes of particular companies in the 
private market.  See Claims Trading Monthly: February 2012, SECOND MKT., 
https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/ february-2012-claims-traded-monthly2 (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2012) (indicating that SecondMarket can track the number of trades, as well as 
other comprehensive data taking place on its platform). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
As it stood before the adoption of the Threshold Provision, § 12(g) 
was out of step with the realities of the modern securities industry.  
There was certainly a need to reform § 12(g).  However, due to the way 
the Threshold Provision is drafted, it fails to adequately resolve 
fundamental problems with § 12(g).  As a result, the Threshold 
Provision will promote a dysfunctional standard for the mandatory 
disclosure triggering requirements, and it will reduce the number of 
companies that conduct IPOs.  These unintended consequences can be 
avoided by changing the § 12(g) criteria to reflect trading volumes and 
beneficial ownership in the private and public spheres. 
 
 
 
